The Allahabad High Court dismissed a writ petition filed by M/s Mishra Security Services, holding that writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass the statutory limitation prescribed for filing an appeal under the GST law. A Division Bench comprising Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary observed that a taxpayer who fails to avail the statutory appellate remedy within the prescribed time cannot subsequently seek to challenge the assessment order through a writ petition merely to overcome the bar of limitation.

The petitioner challenged a GST assessment order dated 04.06.2025 and the underlying show cause notice, contending that the proceedings were without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. It was also sought that the authorities be restrained from taking any coercive action pursuant to the assessment order.

The Court further observed that the assessment order had been passed nearly a year before the filing of the present writ petition. It also took note of the fact that an earlier writ petition filed by the assessee had been withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh petition with better particulars, and therefore no adjudication on merits had taken place in the earlier round.

“We are rather surprised and are unable to countenance as to how can the petitioner file the present writ petition at this belated stage, merely to bypass the limitation prescribed for filing a statutory appeal under Section 107(1) of the GST Act.”

Referring to Section 107 of the GST Act, the High Court reiterated that an appeal must be filed within the prescribed period and that the appellate authority’s power to condone delay is restricted to the extent specifically provided under the statute. The Bench relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in Singh Enterprises v. CCE, Jamshedpur and Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited, which held that statutory authorities cannot condone delay beyond the period expressly permitted by law.

The Court found that the petitioner was attempting to challenge the assessment order indirectly through writ proceedings after allowing the statutory period for filing an appeal to lapse. It emphasized that tax laws require expeditious adjudication and that litigants cannot be permitted to circumvent the legislative scheme by approaching the High Court after becoming time-barred before the appellate forum.

“One cannot do indirectly which one cannot do directly (quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum.) and in any case, law does not help and/or come in rescue to a person, who sleeps over his own rights.”

The Bench also referred to its earlier decision in Atlantis Intelligence Ltd., wherein it had summarized the principles governing maintainability of writ petitions after expiry of the limitation period prescribed under a special statute. It observed that entertaining such petitions would effectively render the statutory limitation provisions otiose and defeat the legislative intent.

Holding that the case involved neither a gross violation of natural justice nor any patent illegality, the High Court declined to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction. Thus, the writ petition was dismissed. However, the Court clarified that the petitioner would remain at liberty to pursue any remedy available in law and that the observations made in the order would not prejudice any proceedings before the appellate forum.